

Insurgency in the Niger Delta and impacts on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): Issues and Policy Options

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ABSTRACT

This work investigated insurgency and its impact on foreign direct investment (FDI) in Niger-Delta. The framework adopted was Marxist Political Economy. The theory examines the rules that regulate production and accumulation in society, as well as the state's role in global capitalism. The paper argues that FDI into the oil-rich Niger-Delta caused disruption of people's livelihoods, marginalization, and social exclusion, all of which acted as stumbling blocks for foreign capital in the region. It shows that this was the dialectical result of the oil majors and Nigerian government's accumulation crisis. The insurgents arose to agitate against oil rents from the oil multinationals and the Nigerian government. Due to the destruction of oil main assets, production deficits, and revenue accruable to the corporations and the federal government, insurgency had a detrimental effect on FDI in the Niger-Delta. This increased oil majors' production costs and caused capital flight, pushing them to declare force majeure, citing insecurity as the primary reason. The paper demonstrates that the relationship between insurgency and FDI is complex. It calls for a genuine commitment from the Nigerian government and other stakeholders to face the Niger-Delta matter head on, enshrining good governance, transparency, and accountability in the oil business, and creating job opportunities for Niger-Delta youths to curb insurgency.

Keywords: Insurgency, foreign direct investment, Nigerian state, transnational corporations.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Niger-Delta region, which is at the center of Nigeria's oil production, has a vast number of oil resources (Okonofua, 2011). Oil resources are of enormous economic and geostrategic importance and value, and they are the backbone of the Nigerian economy. From the 1960s until the early 2000s, oil exports earned about \$1600 billion since commercial quantities were discovered in Oloibiri in 1956 (Okonta, 2006). As a result, inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) by transnational capital became increasingly important in the Niger-Delta region, where technology and financial resources to exploit oil resources were few or non-existent. Foreign direct investment, is considered to have the capacity to fuel

economic growth and development through smart technology transfer, job creation, and a rise in countries' economic activity.

On the contrary, FDI caused conflict in oil-producing communities as there are evidence of resource alienation and marginalization of oil bearing communities, giving rise to resource conflict and agitation, which prompted Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro's revolutionary battle on February 23, 1966. He and his associates declared the Niger Delta Republic, emphasizing the people's dire circumstances. Boro and his comrades were inflamed, according to Ojo (2015, p.7, referencing Tebekaemi, 1982), by perceived social neglect, political marginalization, economic deprivation and ethnic chauvinism engineered by post-independence ruling elites. The situation in the Niger-Delta due to insurgency was characterized by what Keane (1996) called "a zone of violence". This scenario depicts a slow but steady descent into "political anarchy," as defined by the US State Department (Okonofua, 2011).

In the 1990s, the revolt in the area took on a new dimension when the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), led by environmentalist Ken Saro Wiwa and his supporters, internationalized the Ogoni people's plight. As the young became more vociferous in promoting the Niger-Delta cause, the generational shift in the early 2000s culminated in increasingly violent agitations, exemplified in periodic vandalization and destruction of oil pipelines of some MNOCs in the Niger Delta (Okonofua, 2011). Thus, the severity of the crisis may explain the conflict-FDI dynamics which remains an ongoing problem, which the study seeks to explore.

Against this backdrop, this paper investigated insurgency and its impact on FDI in Niger-Delta. It argues that FDI into the oil-rich Niger-Delta has accounted for disruption of people's livelihoods, marginalization, and social exclusion, all of which have undermined economic development that could have emanated from foreign capital in the region. It shows that this was the dialectical consequence of the oil majors and Nigerian government's capitalist accumulation ethos.

This paper is organized in four interrelated parts; part one is the background information, which also includes the paper's theoretical framework. Part two is a review of the literature, part three is the paper's analytical section, which reveals the interconnections between insurgency and foreign direct investment, and part four is the conclusion and next steps.

Theoretical Framework

The Marxist political economy was used in this research. It is a method of interpreting social life that emphasizes the importance of material conditions of existence, particularly economic elements (Ake, 1981, p.1). According to Nna and Igwe (2010, p.6), quoting Nikitin 1982, p.). Political economy analyzes the material wealth production, or the mode of production, as the foundation of society's progress. More importantly, he adds that political economy is concerned with the social ties of those engaged in production, as well as the social system of production.

The implication of the preceding is that this framework is concerned with the formation of society and how it creates its material wealth, as well as the social relations that men engage in during the production process. Such process examines dynamics of unequal economic access building on a dialectical approach.

The main purpose of this framework for social science students is to look for the economic category and use it as a starting point for studying all other aspects of social life (Ake1981; p.1, Eme, 2009; Ifenacho, 2007). The key is that political economy perceives reality as it develops (Eme, 2009, p.viii-ix). It also investigates the social relationships between persons involved in the production process, as well as the nature of political power in any social formation.

Political economy also examines the class character and its impact on the economy in general (Hassan, 1999, p.9). The emphasis on the social class structure is the most crucial discovery that Marxian political economy has. Class is a socioeconomic entity that is defined by its relationship to the means of production, distribution, and exchange, whether as capital owners or wage laborers. The economic relevance of this framework is reinforced in Beckman (1980, cited in Hassan,1999),who stated in a critique of various frameworks of analysis in the social sciences such as capital's power over labor believed to be a matter of economic not political science" (p.102-103).

Further, the political economy approach aids our understanding of all of these contentions. We place our analysis in the context of the Nigerian state, its character, and the production processes, as well as how the oil wind fall from the Niger Delta is unequally allocated cross the Nigerian polity. The key essence of this framework, according to Nna (2004), is its concern with the nature of capitalism as a global phenomenon, as well as the nature of capitalism's relationship between the center and the periphery. There is also the belief that imperialism had a significant impact on the nature and prospects of development in the periphery. It is assumed that reality is defined by dynamism as a result of the ubiquitous contradictions that characterize material existence (Nna, 2004.p239).

In what follows, foreign capital, landed aristocracy, and the Nigerian state, which provides the legal framework for foreign capital to operate, form different classes with similar objectives, whereas oil-producing communities and their youths form a different class structure with objectives diametrically opposed to the former. Because of the two classes' interests, their relationship

is asymmetrical. The point of disagreement is how the surplus generated and appropriated by the dual parasites (the Nigerian government and oil multinationals) contributed to the rise of insurgency in the Niger Delta. Such as violent ethnic militia groups, criminal gangs engaged in oil bunkering as well as sea pirates and particular how these insurgent activities undermine FDI.

Political economy's utility in evaluating social processes stems from its broad perspective on social phenomena. We adopt it in this context to understand insurgency and its impact on foreign direct investment because it is the inflow of foreign direct investment into the region by foreign capital for production and accumulation that creates its own contradictions in terms of environmental degradation and marginalization of the Niger Delta region by the dual parasites (Nigerian state and oil firms). This insight into the struggle that gave rise to insurgency justifies the utility of the political economy framework in this research.

Literature Review

Insurgency

Different scholars have presented various interpretations and meanings of insurgency. It is a phenomenon in which people use it to express their dissatisfaction with government policies on perceived marginalization or in pursuit of personal advantage.

Insurgency, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 1980, p.2 referenced in Christopher, 2007, p.85), is a long-term political-military action aimed at entirely or partially dominating a country's resources by employing irregular military troops and unlawful political groups. Insurgency relies on a variety of activities to achieve its goals. Guerrilla warfare, terrorism, political mobilization, propaganda, recruitment, clandestine party formation, and other operations, for example, are all meant to undermine government control and legitimacy.

The ambition to control exclusively terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not entail the development of an alternative government capable of managing a specific area or country, is a common denominator among most insurgent groups (Daniel et al, 2011). The idea that insurgency has been employed as a tool of foreign policy by states across time, particularly during the Cold War is not contested.

Due to the danger it poses, insurgency exacerbates the security situation in any given country. Many academics view insurgency through polarized lenses. An insurgency may be viewed as a freedom fighter by some, while it may be viewed as a threat or enemy of the state by others. Insurgency, contrary to popular assumption, is a term for low-intensity conflict closely linked to terrorism (Roberts, n.d). It is defined as a movement of the powerless that uses it to draw the attention of governments to the need for recognition.

According to the Joint Publication and Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, insurgency is "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of an established government through the use of subversion and military combat" (Daniel et al., 2011, p.16). Terrorism is regarded to be a strategy adopted by rebels to achieve their goals in a certain setting. This is partly due to the psychological harm that terrorist acts do the general public, which puts pressure on the government to comply with insurgent demands. Terrorist activities allow terrorists to send a message to the government while also raising psychological fear and anxiety among the populace. This generates a stressful atmosphere, which frequently leads to citizens putting pressure on the government. According to Taber, insurgency is "a basic encompassing notion that refers to the battle between a government and an out-group or opponent in which the latter employs both political resources and violence to change, reformulate, or defend the legitimacy of one or more four important parts of politics" (2002,p.viii).

Insurgencies thrive in a political system that pits one group against another due to wide societal divisions such as ethnic, economic, and political differences. To put it another way, insurgency thrives in political systems with massive governance inadequacies, chronic poverty (poor of lack of access), unemployment, and large disparities across groups (Endler & Sandler, 2006).

According to Daniel et al. (2011), one of the techniques used by insurgents is guerilla warfare and political mobilization, both of which aid in attracting outside support for their operations. According to Daniel et al (2011), the level of efficacy is a function of not only combat skills but also political-military backing for the insurgent struggle. Aid is provided by the political elite, which maintains a presence in government and offers cover for the insurgents. This reminds me of the situation in the Niger Delta.

Thus, insurgent use different strategies and adapt to changing situations. According to Daniel et al., internal paramilitary formations such as Colombia's Auto defenses Unidas De Colombia (AUC) are not insurgents (2011, p.5). Furthermore, even large criminal gangs are not labeled insurgents because their operations use violence but are not territorially focused. To support their war, insurgent groups engage in criminal activity such as drug trafficking and kidnapping. This has become an important part of their operation.

Terrorism has become a key instrument insurgents use in their broader strategy in civil wars and, more recently, in contemporary armed conflicts, according to Sambanis (2008), Kydd and Walter (2006), and Stepanova (2008 quoted in Mustafa, 2016). In certain circumstances, insurgencies do not openly use terrorism and actively reject it. This is commonly used by anti-

colonial revolutionaries to avoid jeopardizing their legitimacy in pursuit of their objectives. According to Connable and Libicki (2010), as well as Barber (2007), referenced in Mustafa, (2016, p.6):

Despite modern insurgencies publicly denouncing terrorism, it is a tool employed in large-scale insurgent campaigns. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS/ISIL or DAESH), for example, has demonstrated adaptability and territorial gains while concurrently adopting terrorist and insurgency tactics and offering public apologies for terrorist attacks. Guerrilla warfare is virtually usually used as a tactic by intrastate insurgencies.

Many factors have historically provided fertile ground for the growth of insurgency in any given setting. Lack of government control over a certain territory is a fundamental factor for insurgency uprising, according to a large body of research. Weak or fragile states with guerrilla forces present give ideal conditions for insurgency to flourish. Vast poverty, unemployment, and great inequality are issues that have been linked to insurgency, as has the government's massive corruption and inability to provide basic services; the inability to protect residents provides a rationale for insurgency (Endlers & Sandler, 2006). As the authors explain, it is not simply poverty, but poverty due to a lack of access, that motivates the poor to become aware and active. This outlines the Boko Haram sect's situation in Nigeria (Adetula, 2015; Alexander, 2018). Most research on insurgency, according to Iyekekpola (2019), have now presented a case for specific structural difficulties embedded in the political economy of the individual country. According to him, several researchers have focused their emphasis on domestic structural elements such as the weak economy, religion, and political factors in the Boko Haram insurgency in north east Nigeria. Unemployment, weak governance, and religious intolerance were positioned as remote causative factors in this framework (Adetula, 2015; Alexander, 2018; Mevayerore, 2019; Iyekekpola, 2019). On the opposite end of the spectrum are others who see the junction of religion and ideology as an explanatory component for the Boko Haram insurgency, linking Salafist doctrine to the conflict (Nakhleh, 2014). In general, explaining insurgency requires a thorough examination of a wide range of social issues, including youth unemployment, low job creation, poverty, poor and failing economic conditions, regime repression, hopelessness, and inequality, corruption, widespread human rights violations, religious sectarianism, and injustice, including those against women and minorities (Nakhleh, 2014).

When the government is unable to produce jobs, drive economic growth, or improve people's lives, the population becomes aware of socioeconomic and political changes (Alexander, 2018). A prominent example from Sudan in the 1960s was one in which blacks in the south wanted a change in economic policies, while Slutties and Druze in Lebanon demanded equity in the division of economic and political assets, which favored other ethnic groups (O'Neil, 2005).

Another component that contributes to the establishment of insurgency is leadership. The leadership is critical in motivating the organization's members for broad political action. An insurgency movement cannot be supported by a vulnerable populace. The proletariat, as Marx and Engels noted, requires leadership to mobilize them for mass political action. There must be a leadership framework in place to channel the populace's grievances in an insurgent direction, allowing them to comprehend that their suffering and oppression are caused by the capitalists. This is where the rise of insurgency may be traced. According to Adetula (2015) and Alexander (2018), Mohammed Yusuf's initiatives in Bornu State were critical in raising awareness of the corrosive effects of western civilization on their culture and religion among the teeming unemployed youngsters. All of this heightened their feelings and reinforced their conviction that there is a better way to live than what is now available. Most insurgency research, according to Iyekekpola (2019), has made a case for certain structural issues entrenched in the political economy of the given country throughout time.

Zenn (2017, cited in Iyekekpola 2019, p.2) dialectically traced the evolution of the Boko-Haram insurgency in Nigeria to the religious and ideological connection and funding from Al Qaeda through its link with Muhammad Ali in Nigeria from the perspective of transnational-religious connection and ideology. Lake (2018) and Gourley (2012) agreed that the Boko Haram sect's evolution is linked to funds provided by Osama Bin Laden's al Qaeda. They reasoned that the sect's trajectory followed the same animosity as al-Qaeda affiliates and was motivated by hatred for the west.

The structure and objectives are critical. The goal will outline how they plan to extend their operation, conduct and operate against the military, and carry out terrorist operations in various locations (O'Neil, 1991, cited in O'Neil, 2005). It defines the roles of each cell and their coordinated operations to achieve their objectives as an organizational structure with command. As they progress, depending on the state's response to their efforts, they may need to change their approach to achieve their objectives. Ideology is at the heart of every insurrection. The majority of rebels in the Niger Delta consider themselves as liberation fighters. As a result, they are driven by a belief system that informs and justifies the battle against the state, claiming that socio-political exclusion and environmental insecurity are the root causes of their struggle. The ideology plays an important role in their operations. This serves as a technique of communicating with the broader public in order to gather support (Robert, n.d). The majority of military confrontations revolve upon ideology in order to protect their people from marginalization and injustice. This is

the situation in the Niger Delta region, where oil exploration has sparked major violence as a result of predatory politics surrounding oil revenue distribution, which has closed the window of opportunity for oil-bearing communities.

Foreign Direct Investment

The place of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in developing nations cannot be over emphasized as it has over the years shown to be critical in driven economic growth and development. This is so because it had been found to be sacrosanct capital transfer, facilitates knowledge transfer and the expansion of several appreciable economic activities, all of which help to accelerate development (Rodriguez & Rodrik, 1999). FDI is defined by the World Bank as net inflows injected by an investor to acquire a 10% or more long-term management stake in a company that operates in a country other than the investor's (World Trade Organization, 2016, Almfraji & Almsafir, 2014). The threshold of 10% or more requires the direct investor to exercise significant influence over the enterprise, and the condition of lasting interest suggests a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the investee company (UN, 1999). Both of these characteristics are important distinguishing characteristics of FDI. FDI can be either horizontal or vertical.

Costa and De Quiroz (2002) distinguish this from portfolio investment, which is a reflection of passive investment in a country's equities and bonds. Greenfield investment, mergers and acquisitions, or other approaches like as cooperative partnerships have been found to be a source of talents, improved productivity, better equipment, and economic progress for developing countries. As globalization accelerates, the growing importance of foreign direct investment in today's global economic dynamics has grown vital. According to Awolusi (2012), it includes, among other things, mergers and acquisitions, of new facilities, the reinvestment of earnings obtained from international operations, and intra-country loans (p. 234). They argued that, in a narrower sense, foreign direct investment is just the construction of new facilities.

Foreign Direct Investment has been shown to improve the competitiveness of the host country, and compensated for capital flight engendered by heightened spates of corruption, which had seen inefficient workforce utilization, localized investment in industrialization which can be used to grow the country's resources and capabilities (Naidoo, 2012). FDI also has a way of guaranteeing rapid industrialization and increased competitiveness, achieved by bringing operational efficiencies from Multinational Corporations (MNCs) into local businesses (Naidoo, 2012). This trickles down to firms that aren't linked with MNCs, as they learn from the enhanced competitiveness of MNC-affiliated local businesses (Naidoo, 2012).

The goal of an investor is to have a say in management or to gain money in the form of short or long term capital, as reflected in a country's balance of payments (Macaulay, 2012). Evidence suggests that FDI into Japan and South Korea following World War II and the Korean War had a significant impact on the progress of these countries by providing foreign talents, technology, management know-how, and human development through international training and collaboration. Advocates of the market economy claim that multinational firms generate spillovers that help host countries by increasing productivity, transferring technological know-how, and providing other benefits, as illustrated by Onu(2012) (Fosturi et al,2001).

Impacts of insurgency on foreign direct investment in the Niger-Delta

Armed warfare is diametrically opposed to business. There is a lot of evidence that insurgency has an impact on foreign direct investment. Armed conflict, according to Mihalache (2010), has a negative effect on foreign direct investment through destroying assets. It is logical to think that FDI is for profit making and never charity, thus, also is the fact that insecurity is one of the factors foreign business organization frown at when making decision for investment destination. This is so because, observable evidences shows that in conflict zones, a breakdown in the rule of law increases the rate of asset destruction by rebel groups, indicating that the state's monopoly of violence to control its area and maintain order has been lost. Insurgent activities in the Niger Delta affected international oil corporations' operations and harmed their ability to operate at full capacity, putting their employees' safety in jeopardy. The output deficiency in 2003 was 750, 000 barrels. 2009, compared to 2004, had a decline to 370000 bpd.

Foreign oil investors could be fearful of additional investment at the commencement of armed conflict, according to Shaf (2015), Volos, Kyprianidis, and Stouboulos (2015), and capital flight occurs, hampering enterprises' ability to improve asset quality. Due to the fear of armed conflict, this reduces production efficiency. According to Shaf (2015), when a country is in conflict, the negative impacts of the conflict lower the capital stock. According to Shaf (2015), rebels and military alike target infrastructure like as bridges, ports, and highways in order to make it difficult for either faction to reach their hideouts. In a different way, insurgency diminishes the pace of capital stock accessible in a country by increasing capital flight and stalling fresh inflows. This position is supported by Lee (2017), Volos, Kyprianidis, Iniakustent (2017), and Stouboulos (2015). Investors will be driven to evacuate if the investment climate is adverse, according to Lee (2017), because capital owners prefer the marginal rate of return on investment over

their investment and the desire to buy new assets. This puts the host country's entire economic operations at risk. Ule(forthcoming,p.143) claims that;

Prior to the Presidential Amnesty Program, MEND launched a series of coordinated attacks in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, raising the level of uncertainty in the oil-related environment. During this time, Shell Petroleum announced *force majeure* at its Bonny terminal, claiming staff and facility security as the reason. The Okan Manifold was nearly shut down because to the attack on Atlas Cove by Government Tompolo, which forced the Federal government to surrender and brought the oil business to a halt.

The lesson to be drawn from the above is that, as a result of the conflict, the cost of doing business in the oil sector has increased as a result of insecurity, which has resulted in vandalization of oil facilities and asset theft by combatants. Aham (2008), quoted in Anyio, (2015, p.7), Etekpe, and Okolo (2010) offered extensive evidence from the Niger-Delta region to support insurgency's detrimental trends. According to Etekpe and Okolo (2010), Aham-Uba (2008,p.34) as referenced in Anyio,(2015), attacks were carried out against oil installations between 2010 and 2015, while 9339 attacks on oil facilities were registered in the Niger-Delta between 2010 and 2015. Between 2011 and 2013, the Niger-Delta saw the emergence of twenty-three new insurgent groups Premium Times, Monday 18, July, 2016, Vanguard Newspaper, Tuesday 12, July, 2016). Following the increase of illegal bunkering activities and vandalism of the 10-inch Kwale-Akri-Nembe-Brass oil pipeline, Agip oil firm had to *declare force majeure*(its capacity to meet its legal obligations are reduced to forces beyond their control) due to its inability to lift crude at its Brass Terminal while suspending activity in Bayelsa State.

On September 23, 2013, Shell was forced to shut down its trans-Niger pipeline, which has a capacity of 150,000 barrels per day, at its Nembe Creek oil pipeline. Shell oil business faced a similar threat in June 2013 in its Trans Niger Pipeline (TNP) between Dere Nonwa and Tai, postponing 300,000 barrels of crude oil per day while declaring *force majeure* in its Bonny light export the same month (Olusola, 2013; Bello, 2013 cited in Anyio, 2015).

The impact on the oil industry was that it raised the stakes in doing business, requiring more contracts for pipeline surveillance and increased the cost of production for oil companies due to the need to repair damaged pipelines and flow-stations. In these circumstances, where assets are being destroyed, foreign direct investment is unlikely to contribute to improved economic growth and development.

Armed conflict has a negative impact on FDI when it leads to constant changes in government policy. MIGA (2010, cited in Shaf, 2015) repeated this idea, stating that when power is transferred to another group, policy changes against foreign investors may occur, since assets and investments may be expropriated and nationalized.

This is common in civil war situations in which a new republic emerges with a nationalistic and forceful attitude toward foreign investors.

According to Ule (forthcoming, p.147), instability hampered the building of a tomato processing business in Aba, Abia, between 2009 and 2010. According to him,

In the years 2009-2010, Abia State was under siege by a prominent criminal named Osisikankwu and his gang, whose main business was abduction. Several international investors have fled Abia State as a result of his actions. This was the time when Watanmal Group, a British tomato manufacturing company, was planning to open a manufacturing factory in Osioma Aba in collaboration with Gino, an Italian tomato company. These companies dropped out of the project and relocated to the Benin Republic, claiming security as their primary concern

The point is that insurgency has a negative influence on foreign direct investment. However, there is a caveat to this. Bearman (2000), Shaf (2015) pointed that foreign investors may be inclined to invest in a conflict zone on the premise that conflict can be counteracted from spreading into the investment area. This may act as a safety net for investment infrastructure. This could explain the reality in the Niger-Delta scenario, where security personnel heavily defended most oil infrastructure in urban and commercial areas from militia incursion. There have been occasions where oil infrastructure has been separated in such a way that investment flows into a location far apart from the conflict zone, provided that the area can be contained by military troops. Okonofua (2011,p.164) mentioned the European Union's massive investment in establishing pipelines from the area to transfer petroleum and gas to Europe, as well as a \$28 million dollar investment in Nigeria's oil and gas business (Okonofua, 2011).

2. CONCLUSION

Insurgency and foreign direct investment are intertwined in the Niger-Delta region as this study demonstrates. The study reveals that insurgency has a detrimental impact on foreign direct investment in the area because infrastructure is under threat from militia actions. It also hints at the real behavior of foreign direct investment in insurgent situations, demonstrating that, in some cases, the severity of the conflict and the military's ability to control the conflict influence foreign direct investment. However, the insurgency

constituted a threat to the Nigerian State's and oil majors' economic jugulars, as a series of attacks on oil majors' and Nigerian State's facilities forced numerous oil multinationals to declare force majeure. It demonstrates that insurgency in the region arose as a result of weak administration, leadership failure, oil company neglect and insensitivity, and Nigerian State complicity in the Niger-Delta issue. Given the nature of the oil war and the use of placebo as medicine to resolve the crisis, it continues by wondering whether the window of opportunity for a genuine resolution of the Niger-Delta dilemma has closed due to the threat of corruption within the intervention agencies.

Recommendations

Conflict, in any form, undermines economic development. Against the backdrop of persistent insurgent activities in post amnesty Niger Delta, it is expedient to proffer some policy option as follows;

- (i) The Nigerian government must demonstrate greater commitment to really tackling the Niger-Delta question, as this will prevent the region's conflict from escalating further. This should be followed by good governance, accountability, and openness in the management of the oil industry in order to protect the oil-bearing communities' rights.
- (ii) Oil multinationals should do more for the host communities in terms of corporate social responsibility (CSR). This will improve relations between oil firms and the communities they serve. Increase job and empowerment prospects for Niger-Delta youths by allowing them to participate in the oil business, since this will foster a sense of belonging and positive relationships between multinational corporations and host communities. This will help to curb the flood of violence directed at oil companies by local teenagers.
- (iii) There is need for upward review revenue allocation formula and derivative principle the existing 13% puts the oil bearing communities at a great loss with increasing poverty, which contracts the regions oil wealth.
- (iv) There is need for strategic development plan to reposition the Niger Delta. A Marshal plan is necessary as environmental degradation increasingly destroy the natural environment. The UNEP report which recommends effective clean- up of most polluted communities such as ogoni remains politicized by the federal government. These are some of the key policy options that could mitigate resurgence of agitation and insurgency in the region.
- (v) To overcome frustration aggression and post amnesty poor reintegration, massive empowerment programme that targets the youth both ex-combatants and non- combatants is recommended. This will alleviate poverty and sufferings and in particular, check criminality and oil related crimes in the region.

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Informed consent

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Conflicts of interests

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interests.

Data and materials availability

All data associated with this study are present in the paper.

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